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[Crim. No. 5085. In Bank. June 13, 1950.J

PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LUIS LOPEZ MENDES,
Appellant.
Orlminal Law-Venue-Change of Venue-Rearing and Determmation.-In a prosecution of a Mexican national for

)

murder of a deputy sheriff, it could not be said that the trial
. court erred in denying the defendant's motion for change of
venue on the ground that he could not secure a fair and impartial trial in the county owing to the popularity of the d .....
cedent, the fact that the inhabitants were well known to each
other in a small county, and the customary newspaper publicity,
where it appeared that the jury was selected without undue
difficulty, that defendant did not exhaust his challenges, and
that the trial did not take place until approximately three
months after the homicide.

see 7 Cal.Jur: 920 j 14 Am.Jm. 929.
1

Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 96; [2] Criminal Law,
[3] Criminal Law, § 252; [4] Criminal Law, § 267;
VUIW.U . . . Law, § 457; [6] Homicide, § 173; [7] Criminal Law,
; [8] Homicide, § 145; [9] Criminal Law, Il.308.l.
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[2] Id.-Trial-Continuance-Time to Prepare Defense.-In a
murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion iD
denyin{; a continuance to allow defendant's attorney additional
time to prepare, where such attorney was retained 10 days
before the trial and had the assistance throughout of one of
the two counsel appointed by the court and who had almost
two months to prepare.
[3] Id.-Trial-Continuance-Illness of CounseL-In a murder
case, any objection to refusal of a continuance because of
illness of the defendant's attorney was waived where the attorney appeared 'lnd disavowed any intent to move for a continuance for that reason at that time, and where at no time was
a proper motion made for a continuance based on counsel's
illness. (Pen. Code § 1050.)
[4] Id.-Trial-Interpreter.-In a prosecution of a Mexican national for murder of a deputy sheriff, the trial court did not
err in denying a motion to replace a court-appointed interpreter
on the ground of incompetence, where defendant had the assistance of such interpreter and of interpreters from the Mexican Consulate, and where the court interpreter and defendant's
interpreter were generally in agreement and the affidavits set
forth no errors that were not corrected in the course of the
trial.
•
[6] Id.-Evidence-Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusation.-In a prosecution of Mexican national for murder of a
police officer following defenuant's arguments with a stranger
in a cafe, it was not error to admit in evidence the statement
of a woman employee to the deputy sheriff that defendant haJ
a gun and she wanted him searched, which statemen was admitted to show that defendant had retreated, not because he
thought that the stranger had returned, but because of t11.e__
conversation he hear~ between the woman employee and the
deputy sheriff, where there was evidence from which it could
be inferred that defendant had some understanding of English,
and it was therefore a question for the jury to determine
whether he retreated because he understood the conversation
or because he thought the stranger had returned.
[6 Homicide-Instructions.-In a murder case, the trial court did
not err in refusing an instruction that defendant was not only
entitled to depend on evidence which he may have offered on
his own behalf' ut also t6 the benefit of any and all evidence,
or lack of evidence tending to show his innocence which may
have been offered by the prosecution, where the jury was instructed to consider all the evidenlle in the case in reaching a
verdict, where murder, its degrees and included offenses were
J

[2] See 8 Ca1.Jur. 209.

)
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defined, and where the jury was instructed as to intoxication,
justifiable homicide and self defense.
[7.] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-In a murder case, any misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney in eliciting irrelevant testimony in one
instance and in commenting in bis argument on facts not in
evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial, where
no motion to strike the irrelevant testimony was made, many
of the facts referred to by the prosecuting attorney could
reasonably be inferred from the evidence, no request was made
to the trial court to admonish the jury in regard to the others,
and the trial court admonished the jury that they were to be
governed solely by the evidence introduced in the case and not
by the statements made by counsel.
, [8] Homicide-Evidence.-Thc evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction of first degree murder of a police officer following
defendant's arguments with a stranger, where the jury could
have inferred that defendant shot his pursuer thinking he was
either the stranger or Ilnother. there was no evidence that defendant had any reason to fear the police, there was no evidence bearing on the relationship of defendant to the stranger
to support an inference that defendant formed a deliberate and
premeditated intent to kill him, and defendant did not use the
'gun during the course of the arguments.
Criminal Law-Appeal-Taking Additional Evidence.-An ap.' ' plication to have documentary evidence admitted and added
to the record on appeal in a murder case must be denied where
,; a jury trial was not waived.

)

(automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
a judgment of th~ Superior Court of Colusa County,
from an order denying a new trial. Ben R. Ragain, Judge.
affirmed; judgment modified and affirmed.
fr,ose~cu·tion

for murder. Judgment of conviction of murder
first degree modified by reducing it to murder of second
. and affirmed as so modified; application to have docuevidence admitted and added to record, denied.

-,,..... ___ C. Perkins and John D. McComish for Appellant.
. N. Howser, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Attorney General. for Respondent.
YNOR, J.-At about 7 :30 p. m. on August 30, 1949,
a 20-year-old Mexican farm laborer, together with
and Sandoval, entered the La Moderna Cafe ill

)
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Grimes, CaliforDla and embarked upon an evening of beer
drinking. They had originally l:iet out to take Gonzales from
Colusa to his home in Arbuckle at the request of .Maria Cor(,)nado. Maria was the common-law wife of Sandoval and the
mother-in-law of defendant. Gonzales was a friend of the
family. A tall man, a stranger to defendant but a friend of
Gonzales, either accompanied the group from Colusa to Grimes
or joined them in the cafe. Early in the evening he and defendant had an argument. It is not clear who was the aggressor,but the stranger was the larger of the two and defendant was still lame from a recent automobile accident.
Shortly thereafter defendant left the cafe and returned later.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Sandoval left
and returned with defendant or remained at the cafe. Later
in the evening defendant had another argument with the
stranger, and one of the cafe employees observed that he had
a gun, which he moved from one pocket to another. An
employee asked defendant to leave, and he did. Another employee, Frances Mendes, asked the stranger, who was intoxicated, to go to a shack behind the cafe and sleep. While she
was pointing out the way from a side door she observed defendant at the outside front corner of the building pointing
a gun at them. The stranger proceeded to the shack, and defendant sat down at the outside front corner of the building.
Frances Mendes then summoned Deputy Sheriff Ainger at
his home nearby. Ainger deputized his son, and the two
went in their automobile to the cafe where they arrived about
11 :30 p. m. The deputy sheriff noticed four persons lounging
neat the front corner of the cafe when he arrived. He was
met at the door by Frances who pointed out defendant and
requested that he be searched because he had a gun. Defendant then started to retreat, around the side of the building,
and the deputy sheriff's son ran after him and shouted at him.
In the course of the first six or eight seconds of his retreat
defendant tired two shots in rapid succession. The second
shot struck the deputy sheriff's son, inflicting a wound from
which he subsequently died. Defendant was arrested the
following morning when he was found hiding in a clump of
trees in a dry slough. He put up no resistance at the time
of his arrest, and the gun was found on the ground where he
had been hiding.
Defendant testitied that when he and Sandoval left the
eaf~, Sandoval drove them to their home in Colusa. Sandoval
entered the house and defendant stayed in the car. They
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then started back to Grimes, and on the way Sandoval thrust
the gun on defendant over his protest telling him he would
need it for his protection because they were going to kill him.
During the second argument the stranger displayed a knife
and indicated he intended to use it. Later when the deputy
sheriff and his son drove up, Gonzales, who was near defend'ant outside the cafe, gave defendant, a shove and addressed
him in Spanish. Defendant retreated under the impression
that the stranger had returned, and when he heard running
and shouting behind him, fired two shots without aiming.
~,<.:, ', He had no intention of killing or even hitting anyone and
I wished only t6 escape from what he feared was a murderous
~"assault by the stranger.
~"
On September 29th the district attorney filed an information
t;lcharging defendant with murder. The next day the court
~< 'appointed Ralph W. Rutledge and John D. McComish as
f".·counsel for defendant. On October 10th defend,ant was
(arraigned and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason
;<of insanity, and the court set the trial for November 28th.
rOn November 18th Thomas C. Perkins was retained by the
'Mexican Consul on behalf of defendant, and on November 23d
he was substituted for the court-appointed counsel and at that
time associated John D. McComish with him as counsel for
defense. On November 23d defendant moved for a change
venue under Penal Code, section 1033, and also for a conl.:~wuaD~~e to allow additional time for Mr. Perkins to prepare
trial. The motion for a continuance was denied on that
and on November 26th the motion for a change of venue
a renewal of the motion for a continuance were both
The plea of Dot guilty by reason of insanity was
On November 27th Mr. Perkins informed the
U!~df!:e by telephone that he was ill and was prepared to
1£'h11"_.~n+ an affidavit of his physician that he should stay in bed
three days. . The judge informed him that the case
go to trial the next day and that if he were not present
"court would reappoint Mr. Rutledge to represent defend, Mr. Perkins appeared the following day and filed the
1:A1'tiI1"""f' of the physician.
He did not move for a continuance
that he wanted the affidavit to be on file in the event
,he should become worse and request a continuance for
reason. No further motion for a continuance was made,
and the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict
of murder of the first degree without recommendation.
...... uUJ'U
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[1] On his appeal defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. He urges
the following facts as establishing that he could not secure
a fair and impartial trial in Colusa County; that he was a
foreign national charged with murdering a popular officer
of a small community; that the decedent, his family, and the
prosecuting attorneys were well known to, or friends of, a
large fraction of the jury panel; and that the newspaper accounts of the homicide both stimulated and reflected a hostile
and biased attitude against him in the county. The newspaper
accounts, however, appear to be no different from the usual
reporting of any homicide of this sort. T:le popularity of the
decedent, the fact that the inhabitants are well known to each
other in a small county, and the customary newspaper publicity, do not necessarily warrant the granting of a motion
for change of venue. (People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 482483 [229 P. 40J ; People v. .Agnew, 77 Cal.App.2d 748,758-759
[176 P.2d 724] ; People v. Ford, 25 Cal.App. 388, 394 [143 P.
1075J.) Against defendant's motion the district attorney
presented affidavits of the editors of the two local papers
describing the attitude of the community. The record also
shows that a jury was selected without undue difficulty and
that defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.
The trial did not take place until approximately three months
after the homicide. In view of these facts and the trial court's
own knowledge of the atmosphere of the community, it cannot
be said that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant could secure a fair and impartial trial in Colusa County.
(People v. Brite, 9 Ca1.2d 666, 689-690 [72 P.2d 122] ; People
v. Hall, 220 Cal. 166, 170 [30 P.2d 23J; People v. Yeager,
supra; People v. Agnew, S'ltpra; People v. Ford, supra.)
[2] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for continuances. The fact that Mr. Perkins
was retained 10 days before the trial and had the assistance
throughout of one of the appointed counsel who had almost
two months to prepare, establishes, however, that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance
to allow Mr. Perkins additional time to prepare. (People v.
Dorman, 28 Ca1.2d 846, 852 [172 P.2d 686].) [3] As to the
request for a continuance because of illness, any objection was
waived when Mr. Perkins appeared and disavowed any intent
to move for a continuance for that reason at that time. Although he contends that a motion in court would have been
a futile act in view of the trial judge's attitude communicated
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to him over the telephone the day before, there was at no time
any proper motion before the court for a continuance based
on counsel's illness. (Pen. Code, § 1050.)
[4] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion to replace the court-appointed interpreter on the
ground of incompetence. Defendant and three witnesses testified through the court-appointed interpreter. Defendant
also had the assistance throughout the trial of interpreters
from the Mexican Consulate. The record contains affidavits
of defendant's interpreters that the court-appointed interpreter was incompetent. It was arranged at the trial that if
defendant's interpreter disagreed with the court.appointed
interpreter the questions should be asked and answered anew
I ~or purposes of correction.
Defendant points out many in.stances in the record where corrections were made in this
manner and the court interpreter admitted error. The compe.' 'tence of the interpreter is ordinarily for the trial court to
;:determine. (People v. Valencia, 27 Cal.App. 407, 408 [150 P.
f'68]; People v. Salas, 2 Cal.App. 537, 539 [84 P. 295]; see
;<8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], § 811, p. 225.) Since the
1court interpreter and defendant's interpreter were generally'
t..:in agreement and the affidavits set forth no errors that were
,
corrected in the course of the trial, the trial court was
l!j1ustifieid in concluding that the court-appointed interpreter
competent.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ad¥JlIlit1ting in evidence the statement of Frances Mendes to DepSheriff Ainger that defendant had a gun and she wanted
searched. This evidence was admitted to show that deI<~''''''':U''''~~ had retreated, not because he thought the stranger
returned, but because of the eonversation he heard between
lIHl'l'A.J1IP.PII and the deputy sheriff.
Although defendant with·
his objection when it was established that he was within
and made no objection when the same conversation
related by a second witness, he now contends that the
lJl~b~m.mt was not admissible to show his response thereto
he did not understand English. There was evidence
record, however, from which it could be inferred that
did have some understanding of English. It was
for the jury to determine whether he retreated
he understood the conversation or because he thought
'stranger had returned. (People v. Simf1lO'M, 28 Cal.2d
,713 [172P.2d 18].)

f

.~.
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[6] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing the following instruction: "You are instructed that
in this case the defendant is not only entitled to depend upon
evidence which he may have offered on his own behalf, but
he is entitled to the benefit of any and all evidence, or lack
of evidence tending in any way to show his innocence, which
may have been offered by the prosecution if there is any
such evidence." The jury was instructed, however, to consider aU the evidence in .the case in reaching their verdict.
Murder, its degrees, and included offenses were defined, and
the jury was· instructed as to intoxication, justifiable homieide, and self-defense. The burden of proof resting on the
prosecution to prove every material allegation was emphasized. The. principle embodied in defendant's proposed instruction was therefore adequately covered by the instructions
that were given.
[7] Defendant contends that the prosecuting attorney
was guilty of misconduct in eliciting irrelevant testimony in
one instance and in commenting on facts not in evidence
during his argument. No motion to strike the irrelevant
testimony was made, however, and defendant bas not shown
how he was prejudiced thereby. Many of the facts referred
to by the prosecuting attorney could reasonably be inferred
from the evidence (see People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 693
[185 P.2d 1]), and no request was made to the trial court
to admonish the jury in regard to the others. The trial
court, however, during the course of the trial and in its
instructions, admonished the jury that they were to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in the case and not
by statements made by counSel. We have concluded, therefore, that the record shows no prejudicial misconduct that
would warrant a new trial. (See People v. SampseU, 34
Cal.2d 757, 763-764 [214 P.2d 813] and cases there cited.)
[8] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient
to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. We
agree with this contention. Under the provisions of Penal
Code, section 189, the homicide in this case could be murder
of the first degree only if it were a" willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing." The jury could have inferred that
defendant shot at his pursuer thinking he was either the
stranger or another. If they concluded that defendant knew
his pursuer was not the stranger, they could only speculate on
the question whether the shooting was, as the prosecuting
ettorney contended in his closing argument, in pursuance of:
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a plan to kill if necessary to avoid arrest. The whole incident
occurred within six to eight seconds. There is no evidence
that defendant had any reason to fear the police, or that the
deputy sherifi and his son were in uniform so that defendant
might have inferred they were officers. Thus, if the jury
believed that defendant knew his pursuer was not the stranger,
the evidence would sustain a conviction of no more than
! murder of the second degree. (Penal Code § 189; People
;V. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59 [153 P.2d 21]; People v. Valentine,
f28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Bender, 27 CaUd
i 164, 179 [163 P.2d 8].)
If There is no evidence bearing on the relationship of defendt&Ilt to the stranger to support an inference that defendant
tformed a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill him. Delfendant did not know him before the day of the homicide.
:Although defendant did have two arguments of an undeteriJrrlnd nature with him, there is no evidence that he made
tany verbal threats against him and his conduct was inconsistent with the existence of a deliberately formed intent to
1dll. He did not use the gun during the course of the
tltrguments, alid he left the caf~ quietly when requested to
GO so. Although there is evidence that he pointed the gun
it, the stranger for a moment, he neither pursued him nor
.
with his departure. The situation had become
Ji1lie&ceIlt by the time the officers arrived, and as noted above,
is nothing in the evidence of what happened in the next
seconds to show a deliberate and premeditated killing.
,.Hesp(llnd1ent contends, however, that the evidence that de.,..-,.,-_.__ left the cafe to secure a gun is sufficient to support
(',inifer'en(!e that he had formed an intent to kill the, stranger
'armed himself to carry out' his· plan. ' Even if it is ashowever, that such evidence would support an inferof premeditation, there is no evidence that he left the
to: secure a gun. Defendant testified that he did not
for that purpose but that the gun was forced upon
the return trip from Colusa to Grimes. If the jury
iDluI.1'i ..•.... ~ defendant's testimony they would still be left with
,.
as to, why defendant left the cafe or when or
what circumstances he became armed.
.
the determination of the degree of the crime
to the discretion of the jury. [Citations.] But the
is not absolute. Since the amendment of
1181 of the Penal Code in 1927 trial courts and re-
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viewing courts are authorized to modify the judgment and
fix a lesser degree of the crime in those instances where on
an appraisal of all the evidence there is found to be lacking
any substantial evidence of the elements required to constitute
the degree of the crime as fixed by the jury. . ..
"In determining whether the killing was accompanied by
a deliberate and premeditated intention to take life such circumstances as the previous relations between defendant and
the victim, the actions of the defendant before as well as at
the time of the killing, and the means by which the homicide
is accomplished, are important." (People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d
72, 76-78 [207 P.2d 51J.) When such circumstances are considered in relation to the evidence in this case it is clear that
the record is devoid of any substantial evidence that defendant
had formed a wilful, deliberate, and premedit.lted intent to
kill.
[9] Defendant has filed in this court an application to
have docUIp.entary evidence admitted and added to the record.
Section 4%, of article VI of the Constitution and section 956a
of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for the admission
of additional evidence in the appellate court only where trial
by jury is not a matter of right or has been waived. Although it has been held that section 956a is only applicable
in civil actions (People v. Cowan, 38 Cal.App.2d 144, 152-154
[100 P.2d 1079J), it is unnecessary to decide whether defendant's application would be proper if the· trial had been before
a judge sitting without a jury. Since a jury trial was not
waived the application must be denied.
The order denying the motion for. a new trial is affirmed.
The judgment is modified by reducing the degree of the,crime
tl) murder of the second degree and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court
with directions to sentence defendant to imprisonment for the
term prescribed by law for murder of the second degree.
Gibson. C. J.. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J .-As I read the record, there is an abundance
of substantial evidence to support the jury's implied finding
of premeditation. Although this evidence would support a
contrary conclusion, I cannot agree that, as a matter of law,
it is an insufficient basis for the jury's implied finding that
Mendes is guilty of a "willful, deliberate and premeditated
killiDg."
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Pedro Saucedo, who was the bartender in tbe La Moderna
saloon in Grimes on tbe evening of tbe shooting, testified that
Mendes came in sometime between 7 :30 and 10 o'clock. Three
men were witb him. There were four persons in tbe barroom.
Mendes commenced ". . . sort of knocking or shaking the
bottles on the bar." Saucedo told him to refrain from doing
so. Apparently, Mendes complied witb this request.
Later, according to Saucedo, Mendes". . . sort of got mad
witb other persons." Asked to be more specific, the witness
replitld: "I don't know what he did. I heard just arguments
· . . . tbey were talking loud ... I don't know wbether they
did fight or not."
Frances Mendes, an employee at the La Moderna who is
· not related to defendant, testified that she was tending the
bar with Saucedo at that time, and had served beer to Mendes
· and his companions. There was an argument between Mendes
: and a tall stranger. As Mrs. Mendes described tbe incident,
:~' ... well, they were playing at first, and they-they got
• sore at each other. They were joking, they were friendly;
and then after a wbile they were mad, and I don't remember
what happened." When she was asked whether the incident
. was limited to verbal exchanges or included a fight, she re"Well, a little fight, then we separated them and told
Mendes to leave."
. Enrique Sandoval, one of the companions of Mendes,
.
that they entered the saloon about 7 o'clock in the
He and Mendes, with another man and the tall
l!At:r8.11~E!1',. drank togetber at the bar. After Mendes consumed
seven beers, the two men quarreled.
According to the testimony 'of Mendes, after he and two
afl~ml)aDLioIlS entered the saloon, they and a tall stranger drank
~II'Al":Al beers. Mendes said that he "was talking to the barmaid-and then som.eone came and insulted
. • . ." This person, Mendes told the jury, "came near me
then started swearmg at me and tell me lots of bad words
Then he came back to me again and insulted me again
Telling me of my mother. . . . " Such a reference, the
tA.,.,n ...""",... explained, is a Mexican insult.
Continuing his
IStiInOllLY, Mendes declared that the tall stranger". . . struck
when I was sitting down on the bar." Then, as all of the
agreed, Mendes and Sandoval left the sliloon and
away in the latter's car.
Sandoval driving the car, the two men went to Colusa
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and then returned to Grimes, a distance of about 30 miles.
Mendes said that they went to their home in Colusa, where
Sandoval procured a gun. "Early he didn't have anything,"
said Mendes, "but after he came out of the house he had a
gun. " As Mendes related the occurrences, he was afraid of
returning to Grimes, but Sandoval gave him the gun and said,
"Here. Defend yourself because they are going to kill you. "
Mendes explained that he had the gun in his hand when he
reached Grimes, and at that time attempted to return the gun
to Sandoval. The latter again said, "No, it is for your defense, because they are going to kill you and you haven't got
anything. "
Although he was frightened, said Mendes, he entered the
saloon at Sandoval's insistence. The tall stranger was still
there. Mendes"... went to one side because [he 1 was
afraid." At that time, according to the testimony of Mendes,
the tall stranger began to remove his shirt, and stated that he
had a knife and " ... he didn't want that knife just to bless
the saints." Mendes explained this expression as meaning
that the knife was to be used.
Saucedo testified that Mendes was showing a gun he had
in his hand at about this time. According to Saucedo's description of the events, Mendes was changing the gun from
one pocket to the other and from one hand to the other. At
this point, Saucedo put Mendes out of the saloon. This was
at approximately 11 :30.
Mendes sat on the porch. The barmaid sent the tall stranger
to a shack near the saloon where he could sleep. While she was
talking to him through the side door in order to direct him
to the shack, Mendes pointed his gun at them. As Mrs.
Mendes described the scene, "Well, when I saw the gun was
when I was talking to the bby through the side door, and
telling him where the shack was; then Mr. Mendes [defendant J
pointed it at us--pointed at us with a gun." This witness
stated that she knew the object pointed at the stranger and
herself was a gun, because ". . . I saw it shining; I knew
it was a gun (indicating)."
Shortly thereafter and at the request of Saucedo, Frances
Mendes went for the police. George H. Ainger, Sr., a deputy
sheriff, and his son responded to her call. Mrs. Mendes told
the officer that Mendes was armed and asked that he be
searched. As Ainger started toward Mendes, the latter went
around the corner of the saloon and began rnnning. George
Ainger, Jr., who was unarmed, shouted at Mendes to stop,

)

)
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and started after him. According to the officer, although the
headlights of his car were burning, the illumination on and
about the saloon porch was insufficient for him to recognize
Mendes· features. As the officer reached the corner, Mendes
fired twice in quick succession. The second shot struck Ainger,
~. Jr., and killed him. The father fired once at the fleeing Mendes
, and then his gun jammed. Mendes was found the next day in
a culvert several miles away. The gun was lying nearby.
Upon this evidence, the jury was justified in determining
that Mendes, while unarmed, was insulted by and fought with
a tall stranger. Thereafter, Mendes drove 30 miles with his
friend and returned to the saloon with a revolver. The
. quarrel was then renewed and Mendes displayed his gun. At
one time he aimed the gun at the tall stranger and the barmaid, who was standing next to him. Soon thereafter, Mendes
fired two shots at the son of the deputy sheriff who he
thought, because of the poor illumination, was the tall stranger.
. . Certainly from this evidence the jury might infer that
. young Ainger was killed because of the premeditated plan
of Mendes to kill the tall stranger. The departure from the
saloon without a gun and the return with it alone would
Support such a conclusion. But even if this evidence were
not believed by the jury, the testimony as to the quarrel and
• the subsequent display and aiming of the gun at the tall
.~11tr8nll'j~ justifies the implied finding of the jury that the
.
was premeditated.
~"The facts of this case are quite similar to those in People v.
.
,76 Ca1.App.2d 10, 14 [172 P.2d 380]. There, in afEJ6.rIDil:llg the judgment, the court stated: "While the evidence
~W1Clos4es no enmity between appellant" and deceased it reveals
"the former's 'blood lust had been aroused' to the extent
he desired to take life. . . . From the success of his venit was a fair deduction that his act was deliberate and
u •.., homicide.
(People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242. 244 [121
922].) If he aimed to shoot Alfred and by accident bit
,.
or if he mistook Vernal for Alfred, in either event
1'nn.,.rt"•.,.n,·,G intent was by law transferred to the victim
'1'1U111'... v. Piflaroff, 138 Cal.App. 625, 628 [33 P.2d 44];
v. 8uesser, 142 Cal. 354. 367 [75 P. 1093])."
the present case, although ". . . the whole incident
" within six to eight seconds," the killing was the culml!~tl(]ID of events which transpired in the three hours after
." went to the saloon. During that time he armed him1QU.....
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self and displayed his weapon several times during a long
quarrel with the tall stranger. However, the elapsed time is
not the determining aspect (People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253
[86 P. 187] ; People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657 [174 P. 892]).
Rather it is of course a question as to whether the evidence
shows a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." Although from the evidence as to Mendes' acts, the jury might
have found lack of premeditation,· it determined that he is
guilty of murder in the first degree. That determination is
beyond the reach of an appellate court.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

,

The opinion was modified to read as above and respondent's
petition for a rehearing was denied July 6, 1950. Shenk, J.,
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.

